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COMMENTS
AMERICAN STANDARD, INC. v. CRANE CO.:
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF SECTION 16(b)
I. SECTION 16 (b)

OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE

AcT oF 1934

Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 has outlived its usefulness. It has become a trap for unwary investors rather
than a deterrent to speculative abuse by corporate insiders. The section
has been especially unfair in application to complex transactions such
as mergers. The futility experienced by federal courts in attempting
to analyze complex transactions within the narrow framework of
16 (b) suggests its decrement as a factor in securities regulation.
At common law, corporate insiders were free to profit by trading
on the basis of undisclosed information. 2 It was felt that disclosure
was not warranted when securities were bought and sold on exchange
markets where there was no direct communication between buyer
and seller.3 In Strong v. Repide,4 the Supreme Court created a minor
exception with the "special circumstances" doctrine.5 In general, howl. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as the
Act] provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within any
period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction ....
This subsection shall
not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was
not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase,
of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
2.

See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1037-38 (2d ed. 1961); H. MANE,

17-24 (1966); Cook & Feldman, Insider
Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REV. 385, 408-10 (1953).
3. Cook & Feldman, supra note 2, at 409.
4. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
5. The Supreme Court found that the defendant had a legal obligation to disclose
all the "special circumstances" before purchasing the plaintiffs' stock. The defendant
director of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company owned 30,400 of its
42,030 shares outstanding. The defendant's agent purchased 800 shares from the
INsmER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
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ever, pre-1934 plaintiffs faced the insurmountable burden of proving
a fiduciary relationship between directors or officers and their share6
holders.
The legislative history of section 16 (b) was replete with testimony
exposing insiders'7 speculation and manipulation which had caused
market fluctuations and had effectively discouraged valid investment.8
In enacting 16 (b), Congress realized that if proof were required, insiders could continue their devious practices and, except in the most
blatant instances, take refuge behind an artificial wall of good faith.0
Experience with the common law remedy had convinced the legislators
that actual proof of bad faith was a most difficult burden; thus a subjective approach based on intent was rejected. 10 Instead, Congress
established a regulatory mechanism with an objective standard imposing strict liability upon substantially all transactions" occurring within
the statutory time period,' 2 regardless of the intent of the insider or
plaintiffs at a time when the defendant was negotiating a contract which would make
the company's shares worth approximately eight times their sale price.
6. Cook & Feldman, supra note 2, at 409. The Court in Strong v. Repide reflected
the general approach.
[T]he ordinary relations between directors and shareholders . . .are not of
such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to disclose to a
shareholder the general knowledge which he may possess ....
213 U.S. at 431.
7. Section 16(a) of the Act identifies insiders as:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of equity security . . .or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security ....
8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); S.REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7-9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
30-68 (1934). For a brief summary of the legislative history see Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1943). For a more comprehensive look see F.
PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939).
9. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967).
10. Id.
11. Section 3(a) (13) of the Act defines "purchase." "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(c) (13) (1970). Section 3(a) (14) of the Act defines "sale." "The terms 'sale' and
'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (14)
(1970).
12. For the purpose of computing the six-month period, the date that a person
becomes the "beneficial owner" of stock is the date on which he "incurred an
irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock" which was the closing date of an
agreement binding both parties to the contract. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
232 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). "[T]he last day [of
the six-month period) . . .is the second day prior to the date corresponding numerically
to that of the first day of the period in the sixth succeeding month." Stella v. GrahamPaige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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the existence of actual speculation. 3 The section applies not only to
directors and officers, but also to "beneficial owner[s]'1 4 who were
deemed to exercise sufficient control over their companies to profit
from undisclosed information.' 5 The six-month period represented a
balance struck between the need to deter short-swing transactions
based on inside information' and a desire to avoid unduly inhibiting
long-term corporate investment.' 7 Recovery of profits realized from
short-swing transactions by insiders inures to the issuing corporation
or its successor on the theory that inside information is a corporate
asset and therefore profits derived from a misappropriation of that
8
asset should be returned to the corporation.'
The inexorable method of profit recapture contemplated by Congress was implemented by the Second Circuit in Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp.'9 In finding liability, the court matched the insiders' highest
sales and lowest purchases within six months "to achieve the showing
of a maximum profit. '20 In keeping with the strict legislative purpose
13.
This approach maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate speculative
abuses by reducing difficulties in proof. Such arbitrary and sweeping coverage was deemed necessary to insure the optimum prophylactic effect.
Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1971). See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 257
(2d Cir. 1964); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1961); Blau
v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
14. Section 16(a) of the Act defines a "beneficial owner" as one who owns "more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
15. S. R a. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
16. See Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965), quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 4509 (1950).
In and out trading greatly magnifies the possibility of profit from inside
information . . . and makes such profit [all] the more unfair because of the
relatively risk-free character of a short-term commitment which the insider
may make in anticipation of a favorable market development.
17. S.REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
[T]he affirmative value of long-term personal financial commitments by insiders to the prosperity of the companies which they controlled was obviously
great.
Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892

(1965).
18. H. MANNE, supra note 2, at 26; see Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill
the Rats:"52 CoRNELL L.Q. 69, 69-71 (1966).
19. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
20. Id. at 237. In addition, the court decided that it would be unnecessary to require the identification of stock certificates actually purchased and sold. Insiders could
easily circumvent an identification requirement by selecting those certificates held for
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underlying the enactment of the section, the prophylactically imposed
recapture method was designed to
squeeze all possible profits out of [insider] stock transactions, and
.. . establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between
the selfish interest of a fiduciary... and the faithful performance of
his duty.21
A. Development of the Subjective Approach
1. Conversions. The objective Smolowe interpretation was ap22
plied to a conversion transaction in Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte.
23
Here the court used very broad language in finding liability on a
record reflecting opprobrious conduct 24 by the defendant corporate
officers. It rejected the defendants' contention that the conversion had
been "forced," noting that the defendants had made an "everyday
business decision" when in complete control of the plaintiff corporation.25 On petition for rehearing, the defendants argued that no liability should attach since the common and preferred stock were equivalent in value. The court disagreed, citing the independent value of the
preferred stock. Outside holding of the preferred was minimal, and
there was no market for it. In addition, the sale of a large block of preferred would have depressed its price. The court concluded that this
more than six months as the certificates to be used for the second step of the shortswing transaction. Identification would as a practical matter prevent the recapture of
profits from any sale followed by a purchase because it would be necessary to make the
near impossible showing of the insider's subjective intent to conduct the connected
phases of this type of short-swing transaction. See Hemmer, Insider Liability for ShortSwing Profits Pursuant to Mergers and Related Transactions, 22 VAND. L. Rv. 1101,
1103 (1969).
21. 136 F.2d at 239.
22. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
23.
[A] conversion of preferred into common stock followed by a sale within six
months is a "purchase and sale" within the statutory language of § 16(b).
Whatever doubt might otherwise exist as to whether a conversion is a
"purchase" is dispelled by [the] definition of "purchase" ....
Id. at 987. The court's reliance on the Act's over broad definition of "purchase" suggests that every conversion is a "purchase." An insider profiting would be subjected to
liability if the conversion could be matched with a sale following within six months.
24. At a time when the value of the corporation's preferred shares was above the
call price, the insiders exercised their control by arranging for the corporation to call
the outstanding preferred at a given future date. The insiders converted their preferred
into common and sold the common at a substantial profit within six months of the
conversion. Id. at 986-87.
25. Id. at 987-88.
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dilution of the preferred was not accurately reflected by the value
26
on the same date of an equivalent amount of common stock.
Courts soon thereafter applied 16 (b) to other types of share exchanges. One district court took the literal approach, finding a purchase
in a recapitalization involving a sale of the assets of subsidiaries to their
parent pursuant to a merger.2 7 However, two later cases 28 modified the
objective trend of Smolowe and Park & Tilford. The first case found
no sale in a transfer of shares of a third corporation by a corporate
parent to its wholly owned subsidiary in exchange for the newly issued
shares of the subsidiary.29 In the second case, Roberts v. Eaton,30 the
court held that a reclassification of common stock into preferred and
common was not a purchase, even though it had been designed to
place the insider shareholders in a more advantageous selling position.
In Eaton, Judge Clark eschewed the objective approach and the articulation of a hard and fast rule pertaining to all reclassifications.31 Instead, he adopted a more flexible subjective approach which utilized a
threshold inquiry into the possibility for speculative abuse inherent
32
in the particular reclassification before the court.
In Ferraiolov. Newman,3 Judge (now Justice) Stewart observed
that the subjective standard was emanating from the post-Park& Tilford
4

cases.3

The standard that emerges from these decisions can be simply stated:
Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will
be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend
itself to the speculation encompassed by Section 16 (b) .35
26. Id. at 990.
27. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The court placed
emphasis on the insider's option to dissent from the exchange plan and receive cash
instead. Id. at 373.
28. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
29. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954).
30. 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
31. The court wished to avoid enunciating a "black-letter rubric" which would
control subsequent reclassification cases. Id. at 85.
32. The court found that "[t]he reclassification . ..could not possibly lend itself
to the speculation encompassed by § 16(b)." Id. at 86.
33. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
34. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954);
Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
35. 259 F.2d at 345 (emphasis added). See Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and
Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 513 (1950).
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In Ferraiolo,the issuing corporation had called for a redemption of its
preferred stock at a price $9 below the market price of its common
stock. The insider who was a "very inactive director" and who had no
influence on the timing of the redemption call was forced to convert
or lose a sizable portion of his investment. Therefore, he converted
his preferred into common as did 99 percent of the other shareholders
and sold some of the common within six months of the conversion. The
court distinguished Park & Tilford on control grounds noting that the
Park & Tilford defendants had been in command of the issuer corporation and had directly caused the redemption call which had preceded
their profitable conversion. The court found that the insider director
had been forced into a involuntary conversion which neither created
a new opportunity for profit nor contained the economic indicia of a
purchase. 36 Since the transaction "was not one that could have lent itself
to the practices which Section 16 (b) was designed to prevent,'3' 7 the
court reasoned that to avoid purposeless harshness 16 (b) would not
apply. It emphasized that the characteristics shared by the preferred
and common-both were readily marketable and neither could be
diluted in value-made them economic equivalents and therefore no
liability could attach for a conversion of one to the other.38
After the Sixth Circuit's 39 refinement of the "possibility of abuse"
test, four other circuits40 considered the test. Three circuits accepted the
test and applied it to conversion transactions. However, in Heli-Coil
Corp. v. Webster,41 the Third Circuit dissented from the majority view.
The eight judges sitting en banc split three ways on the question of
liability. In order to eliminate the indebtedness of the Heli-Coil Corp.
so that its balance sheet would "make a better statement," the defendant director converted his debentures into the common stock of
36. 259 F.2d at 346.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 345. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) vigorously argued
the Park & Tilford rationale in its amicus brief supporting the plaintiff-appellant's

petition for certiorari. In 1959 the General Counsel of the SEC published an article
summarizing the SEC's objective stance. See Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. Rav. 949, 961-65
(1959).
39. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959).
40. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau v. Max Factor
& Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
41. 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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the company. After consulting with his investment banker and accountant concerning the economic and legal implications of a sale,
the defendant sold approximately one-third of his common within
six months of the conversion. The bare majority 42 held that the conversion was both a sale of the debentures and a purchase of the
common. 43 Whereas the Webster majority applied the objective
standard of Park & Tilford,44 the dissent preferred the "more discriminating analysis of Ferraiolo... to the simplistic rule ...
'45
Park & Tilford."

derived from

The Eighth46 and Ninth 47 Circuits followed Ferraiolo and the
Webster dissent. The facts of Petteys v. Butler8 were strikingly similar
to those in Ferraiolo. The defendant was forced to convert his preferred stock into common stock since a redemption of the preferred
was called at a price $10 below the market value of the common. The
court, with Judge (now Justice) Blackmun dissenting,4 9 held that the
insider's sale of the common acquired on conversion was not within
the purview of 16 (b) since an examination of the facts indicated that
there was no possibility of abuse 0 In Blau v. Max Factor & Co. 51 the
court held that a conversion of common into Class A common stock
42. Only four of the eight justices joined in the majority opinion.
43. 352 F.2d at 167. The court also held that no profit had been realized from the
disposition of the debentures on conversion. Paper profits were not deemed to fall within
the statutory definition of the terms "profit" and "realized." Only cash profits were included. Id. at 167-68. Contra, Newmark v. R1KO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1971).
44. 352 F.2d at 161-62, 164.
45. Id. at 174 (Hastie, J., dissenting).
The choice . . . is between "a rule of thumb" . . . and a rule of reason
designed to achieve a result that is both just and respectful of the legislative
language and intendment.
Id. at 173-74.
46. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967).
47. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965).
48. 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
49.
[E]ither the statute means what it literally says or . . .it does not; . . . if the
Congress intended to provide additional exceptions, it would have done so in
clear language; . . . the recognized purpose and aim of the statute are more
consistently and protectively to be served if the statute is construed literally
and objectively rather than non-literally and subjectively on a case-by-case
application. The latter inevitably is a weakening process.
Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 535.
51. 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
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was not a purchase of the Class A stock even though the conversion
was voluntary. 52 The court noted that the two classes of common stock
were clearly economic equivalents as evidenced by their full transferability and equal voting and liquidation rights.5

3

The court also pointed

out that the transaction provided no new opportunity for speculative
abuse, did not interrupt the cohtinuity of the insiders' investment and
did not alter the risk assumed.5 4 This case was distinguishable from
Ferraiolo and Petteys in that it involved a class of common stock convertible into another class of common stock rather than a senior security which is convertible into common stock. However, the court was
55
not influenced by this distinction.
The Second Circuit agreed with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
in Blau v. Lamb. 56 In Lamb, the defendant officer-director of Air-Way
Industries, Inc. (Air-Way) transferred the stock of a second corporation to Air-Way in return for Air-Way's newly created convertible preferred stock. The defendant's personal holding company, the co-defendant and a beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of the Air-Way
common stock, also received Air-Way's preferred shares in a separate
exchange. Both defendants converted to Air-Way common and sold
within six months. The court's examination of this complex intracorporate merger led it to hold that the conversion of the preferred to
common was not a sale of the preferred because of the economic equivalence of the preferred and common and the unchanged investment position of the defendants. 57 In dicta, the court indicated the ineffectiveness of the objective approach when applied to complex transactions.
There is no rule so "objective" ("automatic" would be a better
word) that it does not require some mental effort in applying it on
the part of the person or persons entrusted by law with its applica58
tion.
The federal courts' treatment of conversion cases evolved from an
objective to a subjective approach because of the need to both deter
transactions fraught with the possibility of speculative abuse and yet
52. Id. at 309.

53. Id. at 306.
54. Id. at 308.
55. Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End o! an Era, 44
T xAs L. REv. 1447, 1465 (1966).
56. 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
57. Id. at 522.
58. Id. at 520.
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preserve a measure of fairness to defendants. Unorthodox transactions5 9
were thought to be within the purview of section 16 (b) because the
overly broad definitions of "purchase" 60 and "sale""' did not appear to
include only routine cash transactions. 62 Although most courts analyzing conversion transactions adopted the subjective approach, few appeared comfortable with it,63 as evidenced by the frequency of disagreement among circuit courts and between circuit courts and district
courts. 64 In order to establish uniformity of interpretation in conver-

sion cases, the SEC promulgated rule 16b-935 which exempts any acquisition or disposition involving the conversion of one equity security
into another.66 The rule, if deemed valid by the courts, 67 purports to
exempt nearly all conversions from the ambit of 16 (b) 68 and thus bring
69
to an end the tortuous judicial development in the conversion area.
59. The term "unorthodox transactions" refers to any non-cash transaction in
which there is an exchange of securities (e.g., corporate reorganizations, acquisitions,
reclassifications and conversions). See L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1069; Lang & Katz,
Liability for Short-Swing Trading in Corporate Reorganizations, 20 Sw. L.J. 472, 475-76
(1966).
60. See note 11 supra.
61. Id.
62. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967).
63. See W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 42-52 (1968);
Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidations: A Section 16(b)
"Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. PA. L. Rv. 1034 (1969).
64. Compare Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967), with Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D.
Minn. 1965). Compare Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1002 (1967), with Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d (3d Cir. 1965).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 16b-9 (1972). The rule provides in relevant part:
Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the conversion of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms of the
corporate charter or other governing instruments, is convertible immediately
or after a stated period of time into another equity security of the same
issuer, shall be exempt from the operation of Section 16(b) of the Act ....

66. 5 L. Loss,

SECURITIES REGULATION

3027 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).

67. The SEC's power to promulgate an exempting rule is not a matter "solely
within the expertise of the SEC and therefore beyond the scope of judicial review."
Greene v. Diets, 247 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1957). In reviewing the validity of a
former version of rule 16b-3, the Greene court stated that the test was "whether the
rule was a proper exercise of the authority delegated to the Commission under [the] Act."'
Id. at 693. Cf. Keller Indus., Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1972);
Kornfield v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1964).
68. Hamilton, supranote 55, at 1476.
69.
Rule 16b-9 followed a diverse collection of conversion caases that, taken
together, establish no general proposition except the apparent futility of
drafting any objective-type statutory provision that will insure against deciding
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2. Terminating Merger Exchanges. The corporate merger area
has become equally turbulent due in part to the murky precedent
offered by the conversion cases.70 The major cause of courts' difficulty
in applying 16 (b) has been the recent ascendency of share exchange
tender offers 7' as the most popular method of non-negotiated corporate acquisition. Prior to the middle 1960's, proxy contests were the
most common method of corporate take-over.7 2 Later, cash tender offers
were predominant.7 3 Then, as the stock market developed an affinity
for conglomerates and growth companies, offers to exchange securities
became the vogue. "The 'raiders' had begun to run out of cash and
the commercial banks had become, at the urging of the Federal Reserve,
less willing to finance 'raids.' -4 The evolution of corporate take-over
methods to security exchange offers has compounded the confusion
which courts had exhibited in conversion cases. Unlike conversion or
intracorporate merger situations in which shares of the same corporate
entity are exchanged, merger situations involve the exchange of the
shares of different companies. Whether terminating share exchanges"3
incident to a merger are purchases or sales for the purposes of 16 (b)
can be determined only by reference to the possibility-of-abuse test.
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.7 6 first decided what factors constituted potential abuse in a terminating merger exchange. The court
found the Blau v. Lamb "economic equivalence" analysis inapposite
7 7 The
to an exchange involving "the securities of a different company."1
difficult subjective questions. It would be comforting to assign these cases to
the scrap heap. But that is impossible ....
5 L. Loss, supra note 66, at 3028.
70. The frequency with which conversion cases have been argued by analogy in
merger cases has led Loss to predict that the conversion cases "may continue to rule us
from their graves." Id. at 3029.
71. A tender offer may be defined as
a public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or
classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon
specified terms for cash and/or securities.
Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, in THr TNDER OFv'R
41 n.1 (1972).
72. Takeover Bids, 27 Bus. LAw. 243, 245 (1971) (proceedings of a meeting)
[hereinafter cited as Takeover Bids].

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. In this type of exchange the target company transfers all of its shares to the
acquiring company in exchange for shares of the acquiring company at a predetermined
exchange ratio.
76. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
77. Id. at 354.
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Second Circuit observed a strong possibility for abuse in the defendant
corporation's voluntary change of investment position while in complete control of the merger terms. Moreover, the defendant's advance
knowledge of the timing of the terminating share exchange was
termed a "classic example of trading while in the possession of information unavailable to the general public."7 8 The defendant's option
to purchase was at a fixed price per share determined before the merger
was made public. If the market dropped, the defendant could renounce
the purchase. If the market stayed high, the defendant could coincide
the timing of his transaction with the highest market value of the
shares. In imposing liability, Judge Kaufman perceived the defendant's
position to have been "Heads I win, tails I do not lose." 79 Almost one
year later, in Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,O a New York
federal district court found a lesser but sufficient degree of knowledge
and control in the terminating merger share exchange of the corporate
defendant. In analyzing a defensive merger situation the court remarked that the defendant's tender offer would be treated as a single
act of purchase even though the shares had been tendered at different
times. 81 In finding liability, the court imposed the highest profit recovery in the history of 16 (b) -$23,311,337.94.
B. Expansion of the Subjective Approach
Both the Second Circuit in Newmark and the Southern District
of New York in Occidental utilized the subjective-possibility-of-abuse
approach in examining terminating merger exchange sales. Two circuits8

2

expanded the subjective approach in cases involving option

and deputization issues. In Bershad v. McDonough,8 3 the Seventh Circuit broadly construed 16 (b) in scrutinizing an option agreement designed to avoid liability.
[T]ransactions subject to speculative abuses deserve careful scrutiny.
The insider should not be permitted to speculate with impunity
78. Id. at 353-54.
79. Id. at 354.

80. 323 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
granted sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405 U.S.

1064 (1972).
81. Id. at 579.
82. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1971); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
83. 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970).
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merely by varying the paper form of his transactions. The commercial substance of the transaction rather than its form must be considered, and courts should guard against sham transactions by which
an insider disguises the effective transfer of stock.8 4
The court adopted the lower court reasoning that the optionee's substantial down payment to the defendant was "tantamount to a sale." 85
The Seventh Circuit found a contract for sale rather than an option
agreement in light of the defendant's grant of an irrevocable proxy
and transfer of two board seats to the optionee. Under these circumstances, the date of sale was found to have been the date the option had
been purchased; not exercised. 0 The opinion emphasized that formalistic attempts to evade 16 (b) should not be tolerated and that courts
presented with such tactics should carefully examine the circumstances
and facts before them. At no time, remarked the court, should a
tribunal stop short of a careful fact analysis by applying the objective
87
approach.
Previously, the Second Circuit had reached the zenith of subjective fact analysis in a deputization case. In Feder v. Martin Marietta
Corp., s8 the defendant corporation had "deputized" its president to be
a director of the Sperry Rand Corporation. The president had authorized purchases of Sperry Rand stock both before and after his election
to the Sperry Rand board. The court exhaustively probed the intent
of the defendant corporation, finding that financial considerations had
dictated its authorization of the directorship. 89 In finding that inside
information had flowed from Sperry Rand to defendant Martin Marietta through the deputy, the court reversed the lower court ruling that
no deputization existed. 90 The Feder court circumvented the Supreme
Court's objective approach to the deputization issue in Blau v. Leh84. Id. at 697 (emphasis added).
85. In Bershad v. McDonough, 300 F. Supp. 1051, 1054 (N.D. Ill.
1969), the
district court noted that the "binder" (down payment) amounted to approximately 14
percent of the total purchase price. The district court relied on Blau v. Allen, 163 F.
Supp. 702, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), in which that court recognized that a down payment amounting to 11 percent of the sale price "was not just a binder but constituted
a substantial portion of the purchase price."
86. 428 F.2d at 698.
87. Id. at 697 n.5.
88. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
89. Id. at 264.
90. In Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the
district court held that defendant Martin Marietta had not in fact deputized its
president to sit on Sperry Rand's board of directors. The court noted that there had
been no actual disclosure of inside information and that Martin Marietta's large purchase of Sperry Rand stock during the period of directorship was not controlling.
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man,91 in which the Court had literally construed the meaning of "director" so as not to include defendant Lehman Brothers.
C. Return to the Objective Approach
In 1972, the Supreme Court again took the objective approach
in literally construing the phrase "at the time of ... sale." Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co. 92 involved a split sale of stock

by the defendant corporation in a defensive merger situation. The defendant corporation's unsuccessful tender offer had left it with 13.2
percent of the target company's stock. In order to avoid 16 (b) liability,
it reduced its holdings to 9.96 percent in one sale, then sold the remainder in a separate sale. The Court's mechanical application of the 10 percent "beneficial owner"9 3 provision caused it to decline to examine the
possibility of abuse inherent in a split sale. Justice Stewart, who had
aggrandized the possibility-of-abuse approach 14 years before,94 spoke
the majority's unwillingness to examine the facts of the case. The
Court's reiteration of the objective interpretation of 16 (b) was paradoxical. The 4-3 majority applied 16 (b) mechanically "in harmony
with the congressional design of predicating liability upon an 'objective
measure of proof.' "- Yet, they sanctioned the defendant's preexisting intent to avoid liability. In effect, the Court placed the 10 percent
"beneficial owner" issue beyond the scope of its alternative construction formulation.
[W]here alternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those terms are to be given the construction that best serves
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by
corporate insidersY6
91. 368 U.S. 403 (1962). A partner of Lehman Brothers was a director of the
Tidewater Associated Oil Company, having succeeded another Lehman partner on
Tidewater's board. At the time that its partner was a director, Lehman purchased
and sold Tidewater securities at a profit. The Court construed the word "director" to
refer to one partner, but not to the entire partnership. Id. at 410. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the Court's decision "substantially . . . eliminate[s] 'the great Wall
Street trading firms' from the operation of § 16(b) .... " Id. at 414.
92. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
93. See note 14 supra.
94. In Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959), then Judge Stewart avoided the "enunciation of a 'black-letter
rubric,'" choosing instead to decide each case on its own facts. See notes 33-38 supra
and accompanying text.
95. 404 U.S. at 425, quoting Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d
Cir. 1943).
96. 404 U.S. at 424.
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D. Beneficial Ownership
In contrast to the Supreme Court's strict construction in Reliance,
two federal courts97 and the SEC98 had broadly interpreted the beneficial ownership issue prior to Reliance. In Chemical Fund, Inc. v.
Xerox Corp.,99 the Second Circuit enunciated a "hypothetical conversion" test in granting a debenture holder's motion for declaratory
judgment.
The total percentage of common stock which a holder would own
following a hypothetical conversion of the Debentures it holds is the
test of liability under section 16 (b) .100
The court noted that the legislative history and purpose of the Act
supported their reasoning. In addition, the court pointed out the "anomalous consequences" of treating the debentures by themselves as a
"class of any equity security." 10
'
To hold that the beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of the
Debentures is liable... would... impose a liability on an owner who

by conversion of all his Debentures would obtain less than one-half
of one percent of Xerox common stock. At the same time a holder of
as much as 9 percent of Xerox common stock would not be liable.
Thus Chemical Fund, able to command only 2.72 percent of Xerox
common, would be liable for short-swing profits, although the holder
of 9 percent of the common, more than three times Chemical Fund's
total potential holding, would not be liable. 1°2
In mid-1968, the SEC adopted rule 16a-2 (b) 103 "to provide that, for
the purpose of determining whether a person is a 10 percent beneficial
owner, he shall be deemed to be the beneficial owner of securities of
the class that he has the right to acquire 'through the exercise of presently exercisable options, warrants of rights or through the conversion
97. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Simon
v. Sunasco, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 192,547 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
98. SEC Rule 16a-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1972).
99. 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
100. Id. at 110.
101. Section 3(a) (11) of the Act defines "equity security" as
any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or without
consideration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any other
security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider
necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity

security.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (11) (1970).
102. 377 F.2d at 111.
103. SEC Rule 16a-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1972).
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of presently convertible securities.' "104 The court in Simon v. Sunasco'0 5
upheld the validity of both the hypothetical conversion test and rule
16a-2 (b). The court suggested that the beneficial owner referred to
in both 16 (a) and 16 (b) was the same person, since these sections
should be read together.
II. American Standard,Inc. v. CraneCo.
The courts' pendulations between an objective and subjective
interpretation of 16 (b) has obscured its ever widening scope. The
simple rule that Congress intended has grown to resemble a general
anti-fraud provision. 10 6 This unforeseen expansion has caused the anomalous application of a limited provision to an increasing number
of investors. The plight of such investor-defendants is illustrated by
10 7
the recent case, American Standard,Inc. v. Crane Co.
Defendant Crane Company desired to wrest control from the incumbent management of the Westinghouse Air Brake Company. Accordingly, Crane began purchasing Air Brake common stock on the
open market in June, 1967. By January 26, 1968, Crane had acquired
10.08 percent of the outstanding Air Brake shares. On February 20th,
Crane filed 14-B'10 statements with the SEC, declaring its intention to
solicit proxies to elect directors to Air Brake's board. During the week
of April 8th, Crane mailed both a proxy statement and a tender offer 0 9
to Air Brake shareholders. However, on June 7th, Air Brake and
American Standard, Inc. merged." 0 Pursuant to this merger, Crane
104. 5 L. Loss, supra note 66, at 3059.
105. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 192,547 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
106. 5 R Ev. oP Sec. REG. 982 (Feb. 4, 1972).
107. 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
108. Section 14(b) of the Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful ... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors, to give, or refrain from giving a proxy, consent, or authorization in respect of any security registered pursuant to section

781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1970).
109. Crane publicly announced on April 6, 1968 its tender offer for all of the
outstanding Air Brake shares. The tender offer was to expire on April 19, 1968, but
was subsequently extended three times. By the terms of the tender offer, Crane proposed an exchange of stock and debentures totalling $50 in face amount for each share

of Air Brake common. See note 71 supra.
110. The Air Brake-Standard merger was a classic example of a defensive merger.
After Crane's initial purchases of Air Brake shares, Air Brake informed Crane on November 3, 1967, that it did not wish to pursue any merger discussion with Crane. On
December 7, 1967, Air Brake amended its by-laws (it increased the minimum cumula-
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exchanged its Air Brake common shares for Standard convertible
preference shares."" On June 13th, Crane sold all but 10,000 of its
Standard preference shares." 2
Plainiff 1 3 Standard sued to recover short-swing profits allegedly
11 4
realized by Crane in violation of section 16 (b). The district court
found that opportunities for speculative abuse inhered in Crane's
purchase and sale of Air Brake stock within a six-month period and
granted plaintiff's crossmotion for summary judgment." 5 Subsequently,
five vote necessary to obtain representation on the board from 9.1 percent to 25 percent) to prevent Crane from obtaining representation on its board of directors. In midDecember, 1967, Standard made its initial overture to Air Brake through its investment banking representative, Blyth & Company. On February 19, 1968, Standard,
through Blyth, proposed a detailed merger exchange to Air Brake. On March 4, 1968,
Air Brake and Standard agreed to merge, subject to shareholders approval on May
16, 1968. Notwithstanding the March 4, 1968 Air Brake-Standard agreement to merge,
Crane continued purchasing shares on the open market and mailed its proxy solicitations and tender offer. The more shares and proxies received, the better would be
Crane's chances of defeating the Air Brake-Standard merger on May 26, 1968. However, on the day that Crane's tender offer was to expire (April 19, 1968), Standard
manipulated the price of the Air Brake stock. Standard purchased 170,000 shares of
Air Brake stock on the New York Stock Exchange at an average price of $49.50.
Standard sold 100,000 shares to Investors Diversified Services, Inc. off the market
(Standard's telegram to IDS confirming the sale was marked "Highly Confidential")
and 20,000 shares on the market to Dillon Read & Co. The sales were at a negotiated
average price of $44.50. Standard lost over $500,000 on its transactions for the day.
Standard's extraordinary buying, coupled with its secret sales off the market, inevitably
distorted the market picture and deceived public investors, particularly the Air Brake
shareholders. Once the price of Air Brake stock (which had opened at $45v4) reached
$50, Crane's tender offer was doomed to fail. At this point, Crane accelerated its open
market purchasing and turned to the courts for relief. From April 29 to May 24, 1968,
Crane purchased an additional 491,861 shares at a cost of over $24,000,000. Nevertheless, on May 26, 1968, the Air Brake shareholders voted (2,903,869 to 1,180,298) to
approve the merger with Standard. Meanwhile from May 21 to June 3, 1968, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held a trial on the merits. On
June 5, 1968, the court dismissed Crane's consolidated complaint, enabling the Air
Brake-Standard merger to be formalized two days later.
111. At the date of the Air Brake-Standard merger, Crane held 1,480,623 shares
of Air Brake common. In the Air Brake-Standard merger exchange, Standard issued one
share of a new convertible preference stock (worth $4.75) for each two Air Brake
shares. Each share of the Standard preference stock was convertible into 2% shares of
Standard common stock. Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1968, at 6, col. 2. Thus, between
June 7th and June 13th, Crane received 740,311 shares of Standard convertible
preferred for its 1,480,623 shares of Air Brake common. Had Crane converted, it
would have had approximately 1.97 million shares of Standard common.
112. Crane received $76,134,921.75-a profit of over $10,000,000. Instant case
at 1156.
113. Two former Air Brake shareholders consolidated their complaints with
American Standard.
114. American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,237
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
115. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Crane argued that Standard's
manipulative trading activities collaterally estopped Standard from recovery. In addi-
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however, the district court withdrew its opinion to consider the possible impact of Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.1 6 In a supplemental opinion the district court held that Occidental did not bar the
prior disposition of the case and furthermore that Crane's new motion
for summary judgment" 7 was without merit.
A. Rationale of the Decision
Before reviewing Crane's motion, the court assessed the impact
of Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.""' upon its earlier decision.
At the beginning of its supplemental opinion, the court noted the similarity in facts between the two cases. In each case, a defensive merger
left an unsuccessful take-over bidder with a competitor's shares. The
court pointed out that one major distinction lay in the Occidental defendant's grant of an assignable option to its competitor for control of
the target company." 9 The competitor's option was to buy the stock
which the defendant, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, would receive
in the merger exchange. 20 However, the court was "primarily concerned" with Occidental'sruling that no possibility of speculative abuse
2
inhered in Occidental Petroleum's transactions.' '
22
The Second Circuit's decision in Newmark v. RKO General,Inc.
provided the focal point for both decisions. The RKO General court
tion, Crane argued that its "illegally forced" transaction was not a purchase or sale
within the meaning of 16(b). In opposition, Standard contended that Crane's estoppel
argument was incorrect as a matter of law. Also, Standard argued that 16(b) applied
on its face to Crane's transactions because of Crane's insider status and purchase and
sale of the Air Brake common stock within six months. Standard asserted that at the
very least Crane was not entitled to summary judgment because there remained disputed questions of material fact concerning the alleged forced sale. Instant case at 1157.
116. 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), rez'g 323 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert.
granted sub nor. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405 U.S. 1064
(1972). The Second Circuit decided Occidental on October 13, 1971, one day after the
district court had decided the instant case. The instant court withdrew its October 12,
1971 opinion to consider Occidental's impact "[b]ecause the Occidental court summarily dismissed the complaint on a record which bore marked similarities to the case
here .... ." Instant case at 1165.
117. Crane's new motion for summary involved the exemption and registration
provisions of the Act. See notes 131-38 infra and accompanying text.
118. 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
119. Instant case at 1166.
120. Id.
The option could be exercised at any time after December 9, 1967-six months
and one day after Occidental's last contemplated acquisition of [the target
company] shares.
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1971).
121. Instant case at 1166.
122. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
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found the corporate defendant liable due to its excessive knowledge of
the itming and control of the terms of a merger. 123 RKO General actually knew of the imminent merger announcement that would enhance the price of the shares and could largely control its course. In
contrast, the instant opinion noted that the Occidental defendant had
insufficient knowledge to predict that a defensive merger would occur
and was unable to influence the terms of the exchange offer.
We fail to see the possibility of speculative abuse in a situation where
such an offeror simply declines to make a still higher offer or to attempt to block a transaction which
it regards as advantageous to all
24
the stockholders including itself.'
The instant court's concurrence in this distinction did not lead it to
suggest that Crane's knowledge paralleled that of the RKO General
defendant, although it did accept Standard's contention that Crane
consciously sought to realize windfall profits whether or not a take-over
of Air Brake ensued.
Since nearly all merger announcements bring about a rise in the
market price of a merging company, Crane stood to win and knew
it stood to win, whether or not it acquired control of Air Brake.' 20
Likewise, the earlier opinion had found a strong possibility of speculative abuse in light of Crane's ability to control the merger exchange.
Crane ...

did not possess the array of control powers exercisable by

RKO....
...[Nevertheless] there were... significant ways in which Crane
could influence the course of events. For example,

of its own tender offer.' 26

...

by the terms

Nonetheless, the court had "serious doubts" whether Crane's liability could stand on speculative abuse grounds in light of Occidental.'21 This seeming impasse did not trouble the court, since liability could be established by Crane's cash sales alone.
In the earlier proceeding, Standard had posited the alternative
argument that Crane's cash sale of the Standard preferred constituted
123. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
124. Instant case at 1167, quoting 450 F.2d at 163.
125. Instant case at 1159 (emphasis added). See Takeover Bids, supra note
72, at 252.
126. Instant case at 1161.
127. Instant case at 1167. Specifically, the court was troubled by Occidental's
extension of the possibility-of-abuse approach to the exchange of shares of another
company pursuant to a merger.
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a "sale." Standard's major contention was that Crane's sale on conversion of the Air Brake common was a "sale" which lent itself to
speculative abuse. Thus, for the purposes of Standard's crossmotion for
summary judgment, the court in its earlier opinion relied upon the intimate conceptual relationship between a sale on conversion and the
strong possibility of abuse inherent in that type of sale. But in its supplemental opinion, the court pointed out that where a cash sale is
involved, the insider's liability was clear unless the sale was forced.128
The court emphasized that the holding in Occidental did not influence
its earlier holding that Standard's acts had not forced Crane to sell
"when it did."' 29 To buttress this conclusion, the earlier opinion had
cited three cases in which recovery had been allowed against "forced
sellers of sorts."'-1
After deciding that Occidental did not bar its earlier holding, the
court considered Crane's new motion for summary judgment. In its
new motion, Crane contended that the Standard preference stock received in the merger was both temporarily exempted and not effectively
registered. The court conceded that Crane's "ingenious ... technical
arguments" raised ",doubts as to the construction of the statute and
various SEC rules."'' 31 Nevertheless, the court dismissed these argu128. Instant case at 1168.
129. With reference to the forced sale issue, the earlier court held that neither
the prior litigation between the parties, nor the estoppel doctrine precluded Standard
from recovery. The prior litigation had involved Crane's claims under §§ 9(a) (2) and
10(b) (5) of the Act. Crane had argued that Standard had illegally solicited proxies
and had manipulated the trading of the Air Brake common stock. A district court dismissed both actions two days before the Air Brake-Standard merger. See note 110 supra.
In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the proxy claim, but found for
Crane on the manipulation issue. The court held that for purpose of equity jurisdiction,
Crane had standing to sue as a seller. Id. at 798-99. On remand, however, the district
court held that no damages could be awarded to Crane without a jury trial, because
there remained a disputed question of material fact concerning Standard's intent. Crane
Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The instant
court agreed, reasoning that a jury might possibly find for Standard. The court held
that the preceding courts had made no finding of fact that Standard's acts had compelled Crane to sell. Instant case at 1161-63.
The major reason for the instant court's rejection of Crane's estoppel argument
was the difference in the issues in the prior litigation (Crane's standing as a seller) and
in the instant case (Crane's status as a forced seller). The court also applied the "but
for" test and found Standard causation lacking. Finally, the court emphasized that there
was a fatal deficiency in the evidence concerning Standard's control of the timing of
Crane's sale. Instant case at 1163-64.
130. Instant case at 1164. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348
F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965); Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
131. Instant case at 1173. Crane's contention that the Standard preference stock
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ments, noting the possible chaos that would be created otherwise. The
court pointed out that Crane's motion if successful would permit
insiders to
trade in unregistered convertibles and derive all the advantages of
the publicly traded underlying stock all the while being insulated from
12
§ 16(b) liability because of the convertible's unregistered status.
The court rejected Crane's exemption argument because, if successful,
it would defeat the "monolithic purpose" of 16 (b) to make insider
dealing unprofitable. 133 Thus, the court accepted Standard's contention that the specific provisions advanced by Crane "carve out.., only
limited exemptions .. .not general exemptions from the entire Act

134
or from § 16 (b) in particular."'
In rejecting Crane's non-registration contention, the court utilized
the Chemical Fund hypothetical conversion test.8 5 Crane had argued
that this test was inapplicable for two reasons: first, the Standard preference and common stock were not economically equivalent; and second,
the Standard preference was itself a "class of any equity security.'1 0
Although admitting that the hypothetical conversion test might not be
applicable to all cases involving convertible debentures, the court apwas both an exempted and an unregistered security was based on two SEC rules--rule
12b-6 and rule 12a-5. Crane first argued that the registration of the Standard preference stock became effective on July 12, 1968. Crane cited rule 12b-6 as authority for
this proposition.
A class of securities with respect to which a registration statement has been
filed pursuant to section 12 of the act shall be deemed to be registered for the
purposes of sections 13, 14, 15(d) and 16 of the act . . . only when such statement has become effective as provided in section 12 and securities of said
class shall not be subject to sections 13, 14 and 16 of the act until such
statement has become effective as provided in section 12.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-6 (1972) (emphasis added). Crane argued that in June, 1968,
Standard's registration (filed on May 6, 1968) had not yet become effective. The
second prong of Crane's argument was that the Standard preference stock was an "exempted security" until its registration became effective on July 12, 1968. Crane cited
both rule 12b-6 and rule 12a-5 as authority. Rule 12a-5 grants a temporary exemption
from the registration requirements of § 12(a) of the Act for any security issued as a
substitute for another security (the "original security") which had theretofore been
admitted to trading on the exchange. Crane reasoned that the Air Brake stock, which
had been admitted to trading on the New York Stock Exchange, constituted the
"original stock" for which the Standard preference stock was substituted as a result of the
merger. The Standard preference stock thus qualified for an exemption under rule
12a-5. Supplemental Brief for Defendant at 34-40, American Standard, Inc. v. Crane
Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
132. Instant case at 1173.
133. Id. at 1169.
134. Id.
135. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
136. See note 101 supra.
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plied the test on the basis of Crane's "right to acquire"' 37 more than
10 percent of the common stock through conversion. The court cited
Simon v. Sunasco as authority that Crane was the "beneficial owner"
38
of the underlying American Standard common.
B. ConsiderationsIgnored by the Court
The instant court was confronted by a dilemma familiar to its
predecessors. On one hand, merger transactions frequently provide the
opportunity for speculative abuse. But, on the other hand, 16 (b) was
clearly not designed to apply to defensive merger situations in which
the unsuccessful take-over bidder finds itself irrevocably entitled to the
shares of its successful competitor. The result of applying 16 (b) to
such complex transactions is to magnify the harsh impact of the re40
capture provisions 3 9 upon the insider's merger exchange of shares.
The imposition of 16 (b) liability upon the victim of a defensive merger
will be unfair as well as harsh unless a court examines all the facts
and circumstances surrounding a particular transaction.
The instant court's examination of Crane's transactions was selective rather than comprehensive. In its supplemental opinion, the
court observed that Crane's knowledge and control of the timing and
terms of the Air Brake-Standard merger was the "indispensable predicate" to its holding that the possibility of speculative abuse had
existed. 141 In its earlier opinion, the court cited the remarks of a
former SEC Chairman as authority for its inference that Crane's
purchases of Air Brake stock made after the March 5, 1968 announcement of the Air Brake-Standard preliminary merger agreement had
been knowingly designed to reap a speculative harvest.
There has been enough experience . . . for any sophisticated take-

over bidder to know that, unless [target] management joins him,
[target] management will seek another partner and that other partner
will make a slightly better offer. We have the feeling that many of
these [take-over bidders] are doing it for the short-term gain, or, to
use the vernacular, to make a fast buck.142
137. See notes 103-04 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
140. See Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAW. 1091, 1109 (1968).
141. Instant case at 1166-67, quoting Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450
F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
142. Instant case at 1160, quoting Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968). See
note 128 supra and accompanying text.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

However, the court did not acknowledge that other Air Brake
shareholders as well as the general public were free to purchase Air
Brake shares at any time prior to the consummation of the merger.
More important, the court ignored the manifest probability that Air
Brake and Standard might never have merged. On September 27, 1967,
Air Brake's management consultant reported that the trend of Crane's
and Standard's earnings was similiar and that the plumbing industry
(in which Crane and Standard were competitors) was less dynamic
14
than the industry participated in by Air Brake. 3
In addition, the court failed to mention the general principle that
target companies look upon defensive mergers as a last resort 44 and
are usually reluctant to bind themselves until a thorough examination
of the new offeror's books can be made. The tenuous nature of the
projected Air Brake-Standard merger provided Crane with a good
reason to continue purchasing Air Brake shares. Even though Standard's
manipulative trading activity of April 19, 1968 had subverted Crane's
tender offer, Crane's institution of legal action and accelerated open
market purchasing could well have enabled it to achieve victory at the
May 26th, 1968 Air Brake shareholder's meeting. 145 Thus, an analysis
of the court's omisisons suggests that the court underestimated Crane's
take-over ability while overestimating the possibility of speculative
abuse inhering in Crane's alleged insider knowledge.
With reference to control, the earlier court suggested that Crane
could affect the exchange ratio of the Air Brake-Standard merger by
the terms and timing of its tender offer. 4l Not mentioned was the
obvious fact that it would be nearly impossible for any tender offeror
not to affect the exchange ratio of a subsequent merger. The earlier
court also submitted that Crane had the ability to "influence the speed
and timing of the merger and possibly its outcome."' 47 The court elided
143. Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 419 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969).
144. Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw.
115, 132 (1967). Defensive tactics available to target management are discussed in:
ACQUISITION AND MERGER NEGOTIATING STRATEGY (M. Strage ed. 1971); Kennedy,
Defensive Take-Over Procedures Since the Williams Act, 19 CATIOLIC U.L. R.V. 158
(1969); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135

(1967); Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting
Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 1104 (1969).
145. See note 110 supra.
146. Instant case at 1161.
147. Id., quoting Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 358, 365 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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Crane's actual ability to prevent or delay the merger. Instead, the
court noted:
[O]ur search is not to determine whether Crane intended
these results, but whether they were possibilities which in148
hered in the situation.
The court's most glaring omission concerned the Occidental defendant's ability to avoid 16 (b) liability through its special knowledge and effective control. In early May, 1967, the defendant Occidental Petroleum Corporation made a cash tender offer to purchase
500,000 shares in the Kern County Land Company (Old Kern) .149 The
offer was widely accepted by the Old Kern shareholders. By May 10th
more than 500,000 Old Kern shares had been tendered, so that Occidental Petroleum had become the beneficial owner of more than 10
percent of the common stock of Old Kern and thus subject to the
requirements of sections 16 (a) and (b) of the Act.' 50 On May 19th,
the Tenneco Corporation offered, and Old Kern unanimously accepted, an exchange package 23 percent greater than Occidental Petroleum's. 151 Realizing that it had little chance of winning the contest for
Old Kern shares, Occidental Petroleum initiated two mandamus actions in the Superior Court of California, seeking extensive inspection
of Old Kern's books and records. 152 Prior to a ruling by the California
court, Old Kern voluntarily granted Occidental Petroleum access to its
non-public documents. 153 For six days, an Occidental Petroleum team
of five lawyers and accountants examined such non-public documents
as Old Kern's general ledger, consolidating financial statements, consolidating journal entries and details of cash receipts from oil opera54

tions.1

148. Id.
149. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. granted sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405
U.S. 1064 (1972). The offering price was $83.50 per share. An additional $1.50 per
share would be paid to transmitting brokers.
150. Id. at 159.
151. Tenneco proposed that Old Kern transfer its assets to Tenneco's newly
owned subsidiary (New Kern). In exchange Tenneco offered a new $5.50 preference
voting stock convertible into 3.6 shares of Tenneco common stock. The Tenneco package was valued at approximately $105 per share. Id. at 159.

152. Id.
153. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5-6, Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
154. Id. at 6.
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Occidental Petroleum's use of its favorable stock position to secure a special and very profitable arrangement for itself in the form
of the option agreement 55 stands in stark contrast to Crane's fruitless
attempt to avoid 16 (b) liability. The option agreement enabled Occidental Petroleum to "see to it that the matching transaction [was]
postponed beyond the six months period. . . ."G In contrast, the instant court in its supplemental opinion emphasized that Crane's
purchase of the Air Brake common, matched against its cash sales of
the Standard preferred, did not fall within the "uncovered category
carved out by Occidental."'5 7 Rather, such cash transactions were a
"garden-variety purchase and sale" to which the section is objectively
applied. 5 8 In applying the "crude rule of thumb" to Crane's cash
sale, the court chose not to address Crane's "issuer" argument.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) of § 16 are grammatically interconnected and must, therefore, be read together. So far as here pertinent,
they provide:
"Sec. 16. (a) Every person who is . . .the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centurn of any class of any equity
security. . . , or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of
such security, shall file specified reports of the amount of all
equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner ....
"(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information which may have been obtained by such beneficial
owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale
or any sale and purchase of any equity security of such issuer
within
v.
any period of less than six months.., shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer .... Suit to recover such
profit may be instituted ...by the issuer, or by the owner of
any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the
issuer... ." (Emphasis added)
The language is plain. The statute proscribes short-swing profits
from the purchase and sale by an insider of any equity security of
"such issuer." The statute thus deals with a single issuer, not
with two. An equity security of "such issuer" must be the subject of
both the purchase and the sale. The statute does not, therefore, embrace the purchase of stock in one issuer and the sale of stock in
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 31.
450 F.2d at 162.
Instant case at 1167.
Id., quoting 450 F.2d at 162.
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another. It does not permit the matching of Crane's purchases of
[Air Brake] stock against its sale of Standard stock.' 59
The instant court's broad reading of RKO General along with its narrow reading of Occidental caused it to reject this and other "ingenious
technical arguments" mounted by Crane. Occidental's narrow reading
of RKO General and conclusion opposite that in the instant case indicate that a panacea from outside the federal courts must be sought.
Congress, realizing that the mechanical application of 16 (b)
could cause purposeless harshness, 160 specifically granted authority to
the SEC to exempt transactions which fall within the letter, but not
the spirit of 16 (b). This broad power to adopt "rules and regulations" exempting transactions which are "not comprehended" within
the purpose of 16 (b) is exercised sparingly.' 6' Therefore, if the congressional purpose underlying 16 (b) is to be properly implemented one
might conclude that the federal courts must temper the injustices
caused by 16 (b) through a flexible and pragmatic case-by-case analysis. 162 However, as evidenced by the instant case, courts confronted
with complex corporate transactions have experienced difficulty in
enunciating a general rule which would both restrict 16 (b) liability
to those transactions falling within its purpose and serve as a clear
guide to corporate insiders and their counsel. 63 Thus, it is arguable
that lodging the exemptive power in the SEC rather than the courts
has several advantages. The certainty implicit in an SEC rule not only
would provide greater fairness in the form of recognizable guidelines,
but would also preserve the deterrent effect of 16 (b) .164 In addition,
159. Brief for Defendant at 60-61, American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346
F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
160. Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 58 (1968).
161. Hamilton, supra note 55, at 1474.
162. Lowenfels, supra note 160, at 58. The well known rule of constructionCessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa rex (When the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases to operate)-suggests that the enunciation of 16(b) standards is not the
exclusive prerogative of the SEC. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 536 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
163. Lang & Katz, supra note 59, at 485.
164.
[T]he insider knows that he cannot engage in short-swing speculation
with the expectation of later coming to court and defeating or delaying
recovery by entangling the litigation with a detailed factual analysis designed
to determine whether the particular transaction could possibly lend itself
to the speculative abuse of short-swing trading.
Hamilton, supra note 55, at 1476, quoting the SEC Amicus Curiae Brief at 14-15,
Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965).
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the lack of uniformity among circuits and between circuit and district
courts'6 5 would be alleviated by a definitive SEC rule.
The instant court did not mention the SEC's rulemaking power
as a possible solution to the 16 (b) merger problems. One probable
reason for this was the dubious authority recommending such a policy.166 Another likely reason for the court's silence was the SEC's
denial of proposed rule 16b-l1 which had been requested by the
Occidental defendant. 167 The SEC declined to promulgate the proposed
rule, which would have exempted unsuccessful tender offerors, because the Williams Bill was then pending before Congress.
The Williams Act 68 (also not mentioned by the court) was originally designed to regulate cash tender offers. Prior to 1970, this Act required a purchaser of 10 percent of the equity securities of a public
company to disclose his plans with respect to the stock. In addition,
the purchaser had to disclose any contracts or arrangements made in
furtherance of his design to acquire a target company. As of 1970, the
Williams Act applies to 5 percent purchasers and to share exchange
tender offers as well as cash tender offers. 16 9 The court also omitted
mention of another potentially useful device to privately enforce tender
rules-section 10 (b) 170 of the Act and rule lOb-5 7 1 thereunder. In con165. See note 64 supra.

166. In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1965), the
majority maintained that Congress had
confided to the [SEC] rather than to the Courts the difficult task of determining those particular circumstances which would justify the exemption of certain
transactions from the purview of the statute.
Id. at 166. The authority of Webster has, however, been seriously eroded outside the
Third Circuit.
167. See Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 450 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1971);
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
168. §§ 13(d)-(e), 14 (d)-(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1970).
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. V 1970), amending 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m, n (1964).
170. Section 10(b) of the Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ....
To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970).
171. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
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trast to section 16 (b), rule lOb-5 is a flexible and very potent bar to
the speculative abuse of confidential information by corporate insiders. 72 The sweeping holding in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpur Co. 173
may well become the principal basis for all actions grounded upon a
theory of insider abuse of confidential corporate information.

CONCLUSION

The last chance to disembroil section 16 (b) may well rest with the
Supreme Court which granted certiorari in the Occidental case on
April 17, 1972.174 The Fourth Circuit's order deferring final disposition
of Gold v. Scurlock175 until the Supreme Court rules in Occidental,
highlights the importance attached to the Court's prospective decision. It is very possible that the Court will lay down a hard and fast
rule concerning defensive mergers if the methodology of Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.176 is followed. The Reliance Court's
tacit approval of the defendant's split sale method of avoiding liability1 77 could indicate that Occidental Petroleum's option device will

not be exhaustively probed. 78
If, however, the Court holds against Occidental Petroleum, the
policy implications would be far-reaching. An additional weapon would
be placed in the target company's hands.
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1970).
172. Lowenfels, supra note 160, at 61.
173. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Second
Circuit determined that insiders of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company violated rule
10b-5. The insiders had purchased company stock on the basis of undisclosed information regarding highly favorable drilling results in a remote area.
174. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum, 405 U.S. 1064, granting
cert. to Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
175. 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971).
176. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
177. See notes 92-96 supra and accompanying text.
178. In Reliance, the Court analogized the six months limitation to the 10 percent
requirement.
[A) "plan" to sell that is conceived within six months of purchase clearly would
not fall within § 16(b) if the sale were made after the six months had
expired, and we see no basis in the statute for a different result where the
10% requirement is involved.
404 U.S. at 423.
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[T]he target ... not only may solicit a better offer ...but also may
deliver as bait to the [defensive merger offeror] a substantial § 16(b)
liability on the part of the very offeror whose initiative aroused the
target from its seeming torpor and created a large profit for all the
stockholders .... 179
Such a decision would cause great uncertainty among potential litigants due to the lack of a definitive rule in the defensive merger
area. Likewise, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance lower federal courts will continue to be constrained by an antiquated legislative enactment.
Whatever the result, it will be determinative of Crane's fate on
appeal to the Second Circuit. 8 0 If the Supreme Court adopts Judge
Friendly's underlying ground of decision-that it is repugnant to considerations of equity to exclude from profits "the person [or company]
who pointed the [target] company down the road to good fortune"'' Crane's prospects for reversal will be enhanced. For, although the instant court in its earlier decision pointed out that "courts do not favor
the defense of equitable estoppel. . .,,2 there remains the indisputable
fact that Standard's market manipulation was rewarded, not pun83
ished.
Regardless of the Supreme Court's disposition of Occidental, the
opportunity remains for the SEC to preempt the Court in the defensive merger area. However, this is unlikely in view of the SEC's past
reluctance to invoke its rulemaking power. While the SEC will invariably continue to assist courts by filing amicus curiae briefs, it is
doubtful that the Commisison will formulate a new rule. Thus, the
onus is upon the Supreme Court.
WILLIAM J. FLYNN, III
179. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 163-64 (2d Cir.
1971). The Second Circuit remonstrated against such a result. Judge Friendly observed
that an unyielding approach to defensive merger situations would discourage bona fide
tender offers "which would operate to the great benefit of stockholders of the target
corporation." Id. at 164.
180. Crane's attorneys are considering the possibility of applying for leave to take
an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Letter from William E. Haudek,
Esq., to William J. Flynn, III, April 27, 1973, on file at Buffalo Law Review.
181. 450 F.2d at 164.
182. Instant case at 1164. See, e.g., Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
183. But ef. Brief for Plaintiff at 12-15, American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.,
346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

